Signed-off-by: Christoph Wurst <christoph@winzerhof-wurst.at>

To continue this formatting madness, here's a tiny patch that adds
unified formatting for control structures like if and loops as well as
classes, their methods and anonymous functions. This basically forces
the constructs to start on the same line. This is not exactly what PSR2
wants, but I think we can have a few exceptions with "our" style. The
starting of braces on the same line is pracrically standard for our
code.

This also removes and empty lines from method/function bodies at the
beginning and end.

Signed-off-by: Christoph Wurst <christoph@winzerhof-wurst.at>

Signed-off-by: Christoph Wurst <christoph@winzerhof-wurst.at>

Signed-off-by: Roeland Jago Douma <roeland@famdouma.nl>

Signed-off-by: Morris Jobke <hey@morrisjobke.de>

Signed-off-by: Lukas Reschke <lukas@statuscode.ch>

Signed-off-by: Joas Schilling <coding@schilljs.com>

Operate on raw bytes instead of base64-encoded strings.
Issue was introduced in a977465a

Signed-off-by: Leon Klingele <git@leonklingele.de>

CSP nonces are a feature available with CSP v2. Basically instead of saying "JS resources from the same domain are ok to be served" we now say "Ressources from everywhere are allowed as long as they add a `nonce` attribute to the script tag with the right nonce.

At the moment the nonce is basically just a `<?php p(base64_encode($_['requesttoken'])) ?>`, we have to decode the requesttoken since `:` is not an allowed value in the nonce. So if somebody does on their own include JS files (instead of using the `addScript` public API, they now must also include that attribute.)

IE does currently not implement CSP v2, thus there is a whitelist included that delivers the new CSP v2 policy to newer browsers. Check http://caniuse.com/#feat=contentsecuritypolicy2 for the current browser support list. An alternative approach would be to just add `'unsafe-inline'` as well as `'unsafe-inline'` is ignored by CSPv2 when a nonce is set. But this would make this security feature unusable at all in IE. Not worth it at the moment IMO.

Implementing this offers the following advantages:

1. **Security:** As we host resources from the same domain by design we don't have to worry about 'self' anymore being in the whitelist
2. **Performance:** We can move oc.js again to inline JS. This makes the loading way quicker as we don't have to load on every load of a new web page a blocking dynamically non-cached JavaScript file.

If you want to toy with CSP see also https://csp-evaluator.withgoogle.com/



Signed-off-by: Lukas Reschke <lukas@statuscode.ch>